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Falling Short for Labor: Why
the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Does Not Do Enough for
Worker’s Rights, and Evaluating
Better Options
Judd Cohen
Using free trade agreements to increase labor
standards in developing countries has not worked.
Although most critics focus on lack of enforcement
by the U.S., the real problem is the inherent tension
between using free trade to make money, and
spending money to improve labor standards. If the
U.S. were to enforce labor standards, it would
destroy the gains from free trade, which is why there
is no incentive for developed countries to enforce the
agreements. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the
latest example of a U.S. free trade agreement that
does not address the tension between trade and
labor. This Note proposes that the only way to
simultaneously continue free trade and improve
labor rights is through a redistribution of wealth. By
redistributing the gains of free trade, developing
countries will have the means and the incentive to
improve their labor standards. Developing countries
will be incentivized to improve working conditions
and build new manufacturing locations, because as
improvements are made more money will flow in to
continue the growth. Rich countries will be
incentivized to enter into these agreements, because
although they will be giving up portions of the gains
of free trade at first, the redistribution will create
wealth for all countries. Even though the rich
countries will have to swallow a smaller percentage
of wealth generation, the total amount of monetary
 Judd Cohen is a second-year law student at Case Western Reserve School of
Law. He has a B.S. in Business Management from Case Western Reserve
University. He is grateful to Peter Gerhart and Ameera Haider for their
guidance in writing this Note.
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gain will increase when there are more middleclass
countries to buy from rich countries. Only through
redistribution of wealth can the incentives of free
trade be aligned to improve labor standards across
the globe.
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“The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the
abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide
enough for those who have too little.”1
i. The TPP Does Not Solve the Inherent Tension
Between Free Trade and Labor Rights, and,
Therefore, Will not be Successful in Transforming
Labor Standards
The United States of America uses free trade agreements to
influence labor standards in developing countries.2 A free trade
agreement is generally an agreement between at least two countries to
reduce tariffs and promote unencumbered trade.3 The goal of free trade
agreements is to help open up trade between the countries in an
attempt to boost economic growth in each country, creating wealth.4
Conditioning free trade on increased rights for labor is flawed because
there is an inherent tension between free trade and labor rights.5 What
the U.S.’s free trade agreements have done in the past, up to and
including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), is to threaten poorer
countries with trade sanctions and ending trading agreements if labor
standards are not adhered to.6 The incentives are aligned against a
country enforcing labor rights because prices of trade goods will go up
if labor rights are enforced, which decreases the rewards from free
trade.7 If the U.S. continues the strategy of linking market access to
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, U.S., Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1937),
available at http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5105/
[https://perma.cc/WS5L-WR2U].
2. See Kevin Banks, Trade, Labor and International Governance: An Inquiry
into the Potential Effectiveness of the New International Labor Law, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 45, 48 (2010); see also EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF U.S.
TRADE (2015).
3. TPP: What is it and why does it matter?, BBC (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-21782080 [https://perma.cc/3RJS-
8QER].
4. Id.
5. Bobbi-Lee Meloro, Balancing the Goals of Free Trade with Workers’ Rights
in a Hemispheric Economy, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 433, 435 (1999).
6. Rick Rowden, 9 Ways the TPP Is Bad for Developing Countries, FOREIGN
POLICY, (July 7, 2015, 12:28 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/07/9-
ways-the-tpp-is-bad-for-developing-countries/ [https://perma.cc/8RKU-
YZCS].
7. Daniel Costa, The True Cost of Low Prices is Exploited Workers, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 31, 2015, 4:24 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/05/12/should-prices-at-nail-
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enforceable labor standards,8 it would only hurt U.S. consumers, and
would not have a definite impact on labor rights. Sanctioning countries
for not adhering to labor standards is not a feasible threat to countries
that do not comply with labor standards, because sanctions would kill
free trade. Threatening sanctions has not worked in the past.9
Past U.S. free trade agreements have only resulted in marginal if
any gains in labor conditions.10 The problem with these agreements is
that they were more of a political charade than actual plausible
solutions. Past free trade agreements created dueling incentives that
labor conditions simply could never win.11 Without a redistribution of
wealth, there is no way to solve this problem. Not all labor rights are
created equal, and there is a problem fine-tuning the laundry list of
rights in trade agreements to reflect each country’s circumstances.12 The
current list of rights may only reflect the western system’s beliefs, and
perhaps it is best to start by addressing safety issues.13
This Note proposes that redistribution of the wealth created by
trade from rich to poor is the key to solving the tension between free
trade and labor standards. Part II will discuss the failings of past free
trade agreements in their aim to influence labor rights. Part III will
outline the TPP’s solution to improve labor rights through free trade.
Part IV will then evaluate the TPP’s solution to improve labor rights
through free trade. Part V takes a survey of the pros and costs of a
redistributive solution to the problem of using free trade to influence
labor rights; including creating an international agency to monitor labor
salons-and-elsewhere-reflect-their-true-cost/the-true-cost-of-low-prices-is-
exploited-workers [https://perma.cc/VAA9-VHGD].
8. MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22823, OVERVIEW OF LABOR
ENFORCEMENT ISSUES IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (2014).
9. Id.
10. Joel R. Paul, The Cost of Free Trade, XXII BROWN J. OF WORLD AFFAIRS
(2015), available at
http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1215; see also UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOUR FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS GAO REVIEWED HAVE RESULTED IN COMMERCIAL BENEFITS,
BUT CHALLENGES ON LABOR AND ENVIRONMENT REMAIN (2009).
11. PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA’S BROKEN PROMISES 1994–2013: OUTCOMES OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAs-Broken-Promises.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7FU6-GGGC].
12. Josh Bivens, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Is Unlikely to Be a Good Deal
for American Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Apr. 16, 2015),
http://www.epi.org/publication/tpp-unlikely-to-be-good-deal-for-american-
workers/ [https://perma.cc/SRH9-SJNB].
13. FRANCIS MAUPAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 142 (2013).
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standards, and an evaluation of who would bear the costs of
redistribution.
II. Past Labor Agreements Are Inadequate Because
the Requirements in the Agreements Are Not
Enforced, and Because Enforcement Makes it Harder
to Create Wealth
While the common perception is that the U.S. does not enforce the
labor sections of free trade agreements,14 the real problem is not in
enforcement. The U.S. does not have any incentive to enforce labor
standards, because it will destroy its access to the cheap goods the trade
agreements were intended to create. The U.S. uses free trade
agreements to impact labor standards.15 Historically, the labor sections
of these agreements have lacked enforcement.16 While theoretically
important, free trade agreements have not done as much as promised
for workers.17 Free trade agreements have failed, because of the tension
between creating wealth through trade and making it costly to create
wealth through spending on labor improvements.18 This tension also
explains why the U.S.s’ interests are not strongly for enforcing labor
sections of trade agreements.
This point can be appreciated by examining the way in which trade
agreements have been used to improve labor standards. In 1993, the
U.S. entered into the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which was the first trade agreement that included a labor
cooperation component, albeit in a side agreement.19 NAFTA has very
14. See STAFF OF SEN. ELIZABETH WARREN, BROKEN PROMISES: DECADES OF
FAILURE TO ENFORCE LABOR STANDARDS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 2
(2015) (noting the historical examples where the United States has not acted
to enforce pertinent labor standards).
15. See Samira Salem & Faina Rozental, Labor Standards and Trade: A Review
of Recent Empirical Evidence, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM. J. OF INT’L
COMMERCE AND ECON. 4 (2012), available at
https://www.usitc.gov/journals/LaborStandardsandTrade_final%209_12.p
df [https://perma.cc/Q7D7-2MPD] (“Since 1993, the United States has
negotiated thirteen FTAs that include varying levels of labor commitments
and enforceability.”).
16. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-15-160, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS,
U.S. PARTNERS ARE ADDRESSING LABOR COMMITMENTS, BUT MORE
MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT ARE NEEDED 46 (2014).
17. Salem & Razental, supra note 15, at 10 (“[A]vailable evidence indicates that
the ratification of labor clauses does not influence labor conditions.”).
18. See Salem & Razental, supra note 15, at 2–3 (noting that critics argue
whether linking labor standards and trade agreements harms developing
countries’ economic advantages, hurting overall trade as a result).
19. M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42965, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA),
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weak enforcement mechanisms that were never used to enforce the
agreed upon labor standards.20 There has only been one submission of
a labor violation in the more than 20 years since the ratifying of
NAFTA: the violation was against Mexico and the Department of
Labor (DOL) accepted it in 2011, but it has yet to be resolved.21
Political considerations were not strong enough to lead the U.S. to bring
a claim against Mexico for its non-compliance with the agreed upon
labor standards.22
On May 10, 2007, the U.S. Congress passed a Bipartisan trade deal
with the Bush Administration, which incorporated the International
Labor Organization (ILO) standards,23 and made a plan to include these
in all future trade agreements.24 Since the May 10th Bipartisan deal,
the U.S. has used these standards in unilateral trade agreements with
Peru, Colombia, and South Korea before entering into the TPP.25 There
are still problems with labor standards in these countries even with the
new standards as part of the agreement.26 In the last eight years, the
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42965.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9D6R-D75K].
20. BOLLE, supra note 8, at 5–6.
21. United States Department of Labor, Submissions under the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), DEPT. OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalc.htm#.
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666787.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GZQ-
PY4W].
22. AFL-CIO, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: FOUR COUNTRIES THAT DON’T
COMPLY WITH U.S. TRADE LAW 2.
23. Salem & Razental, supra note 15, at 6 (noting that the standards are: (1)
freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining; (2) the elimination of forced or compulsory labor; (3) the abolition
of child labor; and (4) the elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation).
24. VILLARREAL & FERGUSSON, supra note 19.
25. Ian F. Fergusson, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33743, TRADE PROMOTION
AUTHORITY AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN TRADE POLICY 17 (2015).
26. Joan Claybrook, Analysis of the Trade “Deal” Announced May 10, 2007,
PUBLIC CITIZEN (May 11, 2007) available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/analysis-of-may-10-deal-on-fta-terms.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5XG6-CGD9]; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITYOFF.,
GAO-15-160, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: U.S. PARTNERS ARE ADDRESSING
LABOR COMMITMENTS, BUT MORE MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT ARE
NEEDED 1–2 (2014) (noting significant challenges connected with the
enforcement of labor provisions in multiple FTAs); see also, Kimberly Ann
Elliott, The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Standards, INT’L ECON.
POL’YBRIEFS (INST. FOR INT’L ECON., WASHINGTOND.C.), Jul. 2000, available
at https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb00-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3GU-
JWX3] (noting that there has been a lack of enforcement of the ILO standards
worldwide and in countries with which the U.S. has free-trade agreements).
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DOL has taken up27 five claims against countries for possibly violating
labor commitments in trade agreements.28 In 2008, the DOL accepted
a claim against Guatemala alleging a violation of the right to freedom
of association, violation of rights to organize and bargain collectively,
and unacceptable work conditions.29 It took five years for the U.S. to
sign an Enforcement Plan with Guatemala’s government.30 After
multiple extensions, Guatemala still did not meet the Enforcement
Plan’s terms.31 In September 2014, the U.S. government finally resigned
to using the dispute settlement process in the free trade agreement.32
This case, which is still ongoing,33 exemplifies the excruciatingly long
process that goes into correcting a labor violation.
The perceived problem with the U.S.’s approach to labor
components of trade agreements is the lack of enforcement of labor
rights that developing countries are supposed to adhere to.34 There were
many more claims that should have or could have been taken up.35
Government Accountability Office interviews with non-governmental
stakeholders in enforcing labor violations, revealed that there was little
understanding of how to submit a claim to the DOL, and that the DOL
did not make an effort to explain how to make a claim or how it
27. The DOL receives all claims of labor violations against U.S. trading partners
from interested parties, and notifies any country that is the subject of a claim.
After an interested party makes a submission, the DOL has sixty days to
determine whether it will accept the submission for review. If the DOL
reviews the submission and finds a violation, it has 180 days to give a public
report with any findings or recommendations for how to resolve the dispute.
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 24.
28. These claims were against Bahrain, Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Peru. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 25; see
also Cole Stangler, Will The Trans-Pacific Partnership Improve Labor
Standards?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015 4:19 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/will-trans-pacific-partnership-improve-labor-
standards-2127388 [https://perma.cc/8MQG-X8A4] (referencing the five
claims).
29. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 25–26.
30. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 12.
31. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 68.
32. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 68.
33. Submissions Under the Labor Provisions of Free Trade Agreements, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFF.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/fta-
submissions#Guatemala [https://perma.cc/FM42-LRH8] (last visited Feb.
12, 2017).
34. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 33.
35. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 34.
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evaluates claims.36 Even most government officials that the U.S. is in
free trade agreements with, while they understood how to make a
claim,37 had no understanding of how the DOL evaluates claims.38 Only
a single claim against Peru has moved through the system set up by
the trade agreements six years after it was initially filed,39 even though
there have been many possible claims.40 The barriers to the claims are
that governments must bring them,41 and there is a lot of political
pressure against bringing such a claim.42 Although there has been a lack
of formal claims brought,43 there is evidence that changes have been
made as a result of public pressure.44
After the bilateral trade agreement in Colombia, despite
incorporating the ILO standards and a “Labor Action Plan,”45 105
union activists have been murdered46 and 1,337 death threats have been
issued.47 In addition, Colombia has had issues with the enforcement of
child labor laws: “prohibitions against children working in mining and
construction were reportedly largely ignored.”48 By not enforcing the
trade agreement’s language,49 the U.S. is not doing its part to improve
labor conditions in Colombia. Enforcement is the public face of the
problem, but the real obstacle lies in the tension between trade and
labor standards. The U.S. will never enforce labor standards until the
incentives make enforcement the financially responsible solution.
36. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 29–30.
37. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 29.
38. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 29.
39. Stangler, supra note 28.
40. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16, at 25.
41. Frank H. Bieszczat, Note, Labor Provisions in Trade Agreements: From the
NAALC to Now, CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1387, 1394 (2008).
42. Id. at 1395.
43. Id. at 1395.
44. Id. at 1395.
45. STAFF OF SEN. ELIZABETH WARREN, supra note 14.
46. STAFF OF SEN. ELIZABETH WARREN, supra note 14.
47. STAFF OF SEN. ELIZABETH WARREN, supra note 14.
48. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Country Reports
for Human Rights Practices for 2013: Colombia (Dec. 2014),
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=
2015&dlid=253001#wrapper.
49. Brian Finnegan, Five Reasons Colombia Is Violating Its Trade Agreement
with the U.S. AFL-CIO (Jul. 18, 2016), http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Global-
Action/Five-Reasons-Colombia-Is-Violating-Its-Trade-Agreement-with-the-
U.S [https://perma.cc/T6LU-E8ML].
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Redistribution of wealth reforms the incentives to promote positive
change.
III. The TPP Solution to Labor Agreements is an
Improvement, but is Still Lacking Teeth
The TPP is an improvement for labor rights.50 The TPP forces
countries to change their labor laws to ensure the protection of ILO
labor standards before they can enter into the agreement and reap the
rewards of free trade.51 The TPP requires all member countries to
institute a minimum wage, set a standard working time, and implement
safety regulations.52 The TPP will create faster dispute resolution
mechanisms as well as making it easier for labor activists to induce the
DOL to investigate a claim of a labor violation.53
Although the TPP is an improvement, it still does not do enough.
Even with the improvements it offers, the TPP is still deficient because
none of the solutions are redistributive. The improvements in the TPP
do not overcome the basic problem that arises when trade is linked to
labor rights, which is the inherent tension between using free trade to
make money, and spending money to improve labor standards. If the
U.S. were to enforce labor standards, it would eliminate the gains from
free trade, which is why there is no incentive for developed countries to
enforce the agreements.
The TPP leaves too much in the hands of the U.S. to police and
incorporates similar changes in laws that failed to make a difference in
previous free trade agreements. Without a redistributive solution to
properly align the incentives to improve labor standards, third world
countries will not enforce their newly created labor laws and
regulations, nor will the U.S. have the incentive to enforce what it has
required the TPP member countries to agree to.
The TPP incorporates the ILO declaration establishing minimum
labor standards into its labor section as the main feature of the
agreement.54
Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations,
and practices thereunder, the following rights as stated in the ILO
50. The Editorial Board, Pacific Trade and Worker Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/opinion/sunday/pacific-trade-
and-worker-rights.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/JH85-JMWM].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. International Labor Organization, Labour and social policy components in
current trade agreements in Asia and the Pacific, ILO (2015),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actemp/downloads/publication
s/research_note_2015march.pdf [https://perma.cc/7N3L-NW7R].
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Declaration[3][4]: a) freedom of association and the effective recognition
of the right to collective bargaining; b) the elimination of all forms of
forced or compulsory labour; c) the effective abolition of child labour
and, for the purposes of this Agreement, a prohibition on the worst
forms of child labour; and d) the elimination of discrimination in respect
of employment and occupation.55
The TPP has side agreements with the three most troubled
countries in terms of labor standards in the partnership – Vietnam,
Brunei, and Malaysia.56 The problem is that the deficiencies are in
looking for a non-distributive solution that breaks through the inherent
tension. The TPP is yet another illustration of how the current
paradigm cannot be improved.
The TPP establishes an objective review mechanism to monitor the
three problem countries’ implementation of the new labor standards.57
Failure to adhere to these standards can lead to sanctions from the
U.S., such as withholding or suspending tariff reductions.58 A problem
with this approach is that a non-biased party does not monitor
adherence to these new labor standards; instead the government of each
problem country and the U.S. government are the only overseers.59
A. Vietnam Labor History and Side Agreement
The inadequacy of the system is demonstrated by Vietnam, which
has labor laws that are never enforced.60 Vietnam’s Constitution gives
55. Trans Pacific Partnership, Chapter 19, Feb. 4, 2016, available at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Labour.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PL4H-TAYZ].
56. Dwyer Gunn, Will the Trans-Pacific Partnership Make Workers’ Lives
Better?, PACIFIC STANDARD (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.psmag.com/business-economics/can-the-trans-pacific-
partnership-make-workers-lives-better [https://perma.cc/FJN2-3F9P].
57. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Summary of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (Oct. 2015),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership
[https://perma.cc/2F87-KZPR].
58. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Summary of Chapter 19 of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, USTR
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Labour-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NCY-CLN2].
59. Alana Semuels, The TPP’s Uneven Attempt at Labor Protection, ATLANTIC
(Jan 22, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/tpp-
mexico-labor-rights/426501/ [https://perma.cc/NLW2-9XB2].
60. Keith Bradsher, Labor Reform in Vietnam, Tied to Pacific Trade Deal,
Depends on Hanoi’s Follow-up, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/business/international/vietnam-tpp-
trade-agreement-labor-reaction.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/RAL6-2C29].
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workers the right to strike and engage in organized protests.61 Although
these rights are part of the Constitution, they receive little support and
protection from other laws passed by the Vietnamese government.62 The
side agreement with Vietnam requires it to create new laws or to amend
its current laws to meet the ILO labor standards.63 The agreement seeks
to ensure that Vietnam allows all workers to join a grassroots union,
although the government must pre-approve these unions.64 Most of the
side agreement centers on the rights of workers to unionize, and the
enforcement of the ILO labor standards against Vietnamese
employers.65
The U.S. and Vietnam agree to create a government-to-government
mechanism called the Senior Officials Committee (SOC) to oversee
Vietnam’s compliance with all of the elements included in the side
agreement.66 The SOC will be made up of members from the Office of
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the U.S. DOL.67
The SOC will meet annually for the first ten years of the agreement.68
If there is a complaint filed against Vietnam, the SOC will meet within
thirty days to determine what action it must take to address the
concerns of the complaining party.69 Although the agreement looks good
in theory, these new policies will be ineffective in practice, because the
U.S. will likely dominate the SOC, and the U.S. has not changed its
incentives to enforce labor rights at the expense of cheap goods.70
B. Brunei Labor History and Side Agreement
A significant problem with the Brunei side agreement is that it fails
to provide independent labor courts and organizations that are free
from the influence of the Sultan.71 The Sultan of Brunei rules Brunei
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States-Viet Nam
Plan for the Enhancement of Trade and Labour Relations,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Chapter-Summary-Labour-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZB98-JG5J].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41550, U.S.-VIETNAM
ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS (2016).
71. Semuels, supra note 59.
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and bases its penal code on Sharia law.72 Brunei uses Islamic criminal
law, which includes archaic punishments.73 Workers in Brunei face
issues in the labor market relating to wage theft, passport confiscation,
abuse, and confinement.74 In addition, there is a prohibition against
strikes, and there is no guarantee of collective bargaining.75
In light of these issues facing workers, the side agreement with
Brunei contains many stipulations aimed at ensuring workers are not
taken advantage of by employers.76 The agreement makes Brunei ensure
that unions have protection from disruptive actions by employers; that
workers are compensated for anti-union discrimination that impacts
their employment; and that workers have the right to elect union
leaders, to collective bargaining, and to strike.77
Among other concessions by Brunei, it must list all dangerous jobs
prohibited to children under eighteen,78 set a minimum wage for private
sector workers,79 and stop employers from holding employee passports.80
Brunei must take efforts to make its labor laws more transparent,
including making laws publicly available;81 collaborating with the U.S.
on developing and implementing the changes to its laws;82 and creating
outreach programs to inform workers and other stakeholders of their
rights.83 Finally, Brunei agreed that the U.S. to review its progress.84
Brunei has agreed that it will implement these changes prior to
entering into the TPP.85 Although this agreement represents steps
72. AFL-CIO, supra note 22.
73. AFL-CIO, supra note 22.
74. AFL-CIO, supra note 22.
75. AFL-CIO, supra note 22.
76. Trans Pacific Partnership, Brunei – United States Labour Consistency Plan,
USTR (2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Labour-
US-BN-Labor-Consistency-Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4C9-W7SA].
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (Additionally, the side agreement requires Brunei to make institutional
reforms and develop its capacity-building by taking measures to make
institutional changes within the government that will allow it to implement
the new laws; revise inspection policies to ensure that laws will be enforced
by the government; and ensure that effective mechanisms for workers’
complaints are in place).
85. Id.
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towards ensuring workers’ rights and improving labor standards, Brunei
has signed up for a huge commitment that may be too burdensome to
uphold all at once. This is another example of the failings of the U.S.
policy to institute changes in other countries’ laws without incentivizing
them to enforce those laws.
C. Malaysia Labor History and Side Agreement
Malaysia has problems with forced labor in many of its
manufacturing sectors.86 As of 2014, Malaysia had the lowest possible
ranking on the U.S. Department of State annual Trafficking in Persons
report,87 meaning that “Malaysia does not fully comply with the
minimum standards to prevent trafficking and is not making significant
efforts to do so.”88 Forty percent of workers in Malaysia are migrant
workers,89 who Malaysia prohibits from organizing and collective
bargaining.90 There are also limits to the right of freedom of association
for all workers.91
The side agreement with Malaysia seeks to remedy conditions for
Malaysian workers in a number of areas.92 The agreement seeks to
ensure that trade unions have the right to review government decisions
about union registration, and that unions can seek judicial review of
government decisions regarding union registration.93 The agreement
also seeks to amend numerous laws that grant the Director of General
Trade Unions permission to restrict the formation and registration of
unions, as well as laws that restrict the types of employees eligible to
join unions and hold leadership positions within unions.94 The
agreement also seeks to amend the law to remove restrictions on the
scope of collective bargaining.95 Additionally, Malaysia must agree to
amend laws that limit and punish strikes, as well as laws that restrict
employers and trade unionists to select their own representation in
86. AFL-CIO, supra note 22.
87. AFL-CIO, supra note 22.
88. AFL-CIO, supra note 22.
89. AFL-CIO, supra note 22.
90. AFL-CIO, supra note 22.
91. AFL-CIO, supra note 22.
92. Trans Pacific Partnership, Malaysia – United States Labour Consistency Plan
(Nov. 2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Labour-
US-MY-Labor-Consistency-Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3W6-8V8X].
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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administrative hearings.96 The agreement also includes stipulations
aimed at reducing human trafficking.97
Malaysia must also issue a list of hazardous jobs prohibited for
workers under the age of eighteen; establish a minimum age of thirteen
for light work; and amend the law to further prohibit discrimination
based on occupation.98 Malaysia agrees to make institutional reforms to
ensure the effective enforcement of labor laws.99 Finally, Malaysia
agrees to enhance transparency and the sharing of information by
collaborating with the U.S. on reforms and development of labor
instruments, creating an outreach program about changes to ensure
that workers and employers are knowledgeable about the system, and
establish a SOC to oversee implementation of labor regulations.100
The side agreement with Malaysia suffers from the same issues as
the side agreements with Vietnam and Brunei. While the changes look
good on paper, the incentives to make and enforce these changes are
not present. Without a redistributive solution, developing countries will
never meet the goal of improving labor standards.
IV. Evaluation of TPP Solution: Improvements but
Not Enough
A. An Overview of the Shortcomings
As Part II of this Note has shown, free trade agreements that
include labor standards for developing countries look good on paper but
lack enforcement, because enforcement of labor rights would kill free
trade.101 The TPP is part of the same political charade as past
agreements that have claimed to transform working conditions for
96. Id.
97. Id. (Malaysia must reinforce that retaining a worker’s passport is illegal;
ensure that workers who are entitled to housing by employers receive it and
that workers have a secure place to keep their belongings; amend the law to
enforce that repeated violations of labor law are punishable by rejecting future
quotas or revoking licenses of the offending companies; amend the law to
provide additional supportive services to victims of trafficking; and amend
laws that require employers to communicate with foreign workers in
languages they understand.).
98. Id.
99. Id. (Malaysia will make institutional reforms by appointing new labor officers
and inspectors; revising inspection policies to ensure that labor regulations
are enforced; developing training with the ILO for labor inspectors; and
performing biannual data analysis on complaints received about companies
and investigations conducted.).
100. Id. (The SOC will be comprised of senior officials selected by the U.S. and
Malaysia that will meet annually for seven years after the changes are
adopted.).
101. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., supra note 16.
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workers in third world countries.102 While the TPP places more
restrictions on countries, these new strategies will fall to the same lack
of enforcement that past trade agreements have, because the TPP does
not address the inherent tension between labor rights and free trade.103
Cathy Feingold, director of the International Department at the AFL-
CIO, says that “Consistency plans are an attempt to make the labor
and human rights committee feel good that we talked about this, that
we’re engaged in it, but a lot of it is unenforceable.”104 The solution
should not focus on enforcement, but on reducing the tension between
labor rights and free trade through redistributive means.
The best example of this charade is the minimum wage component
of the labor section of the TPP.105 The TPP requires all twelve member
countries to adopt minimum wage regulations.106 As a recent New York
Times article assessing the TPP summarized, “[the adoption of
minimum wage regulations] could turn out to be mostly symbolic
because the agreement does not specify how countries should set
minimum wages.”107 Without specifications to how minimum wages
should be set, countries could set minimum wages “at a penny an
hour—which wouldn’t do much to help workers.”108 The same problem
of lack of specifications in the TPP arises with safety and health
standards.109 Without a specific threshold of minimum standards to
meet, meeting undefined standards could be mostly irrelevant.110
As discussed in Part III of this Note, the TPP puts too high of a
burden on the three problem countries, without properly aligning the
incentives for these countries to adhere to the ILO standards.111 The
monitoring of these countries’ labor practices is not enough of a
102. Semuels, supra note 59 (“Labor advocates have many complaints about. .
.[NAFTA]. . .one being that many of the provisions meant to improve life for
workers were unenforceable. . .[there were] complaints about the lack of labor
rights in NAFTA and other trade agreements. . .).
103. Semuels, supra note 59.
104. Semuels, supra note 59.
105. Editorial Board, supra note 50.
106. Editorial Board, supra note 50.
107. Editorial Board, supra note 50.
108. Semuels, supra note 59.
109. Semuels, supra note 59.
110. Semuels, supra note 59 (arguing, in part, that if there are no specific minimum
standards, there would be potentially little benefit to workers.)
111. Q&A: The Trans-Pacific Partnership, HUMANRIGHTSWATCH (Jan. 12, 2016)
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/12/qa-trans-pacific-partnership#4
[https://perma.cc/66YC-Z4KE].
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mechanism to fix the problems in each country’s labor market.112 Moral
suasion is not enough.113
Only a government can invoke dispute settlement against the other
government for a labor violation under a trade agreement.114 The
problem with this is that there are great political pressures on
governments, so enforcing labor standards of other countries may not
be the most important objective for sitting governments.115 The people
most affected by the poor labor standards have no ability to challenge
their own county’s poor labor standards.116 U.S. and international labor
unions cannot bring claims against problematic countries, even though
they have the most motivation to be watchdogs for labor violations.117
Leaving the enforcement to the U.S. government places a great deal of
responsibility on the whims of politics, because a more conservative
president may choose not to enforce the TPP labor section.118
B. The Current ILO Standards May Not Be Focusing on the Right
Standards
All of this analysis rests on the same assumption that the ILO labor
standards are the correct and only minimum standards that are
acceptable to the international community. But, are the ILO’s
112. See, Press Release, Udall Joins Senate Coalition Calling for Strong Labor
Standards in Trans-Pacific Partnership and Implementation of Standards in
TPP Countries (May 11, 2015), available at
http://www.tomudall.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1965
[https://perma.cc/26B3-MR52] (stating “[T]hese standards must be
implemented on the ground in TPP countries prior to TPP taking effect”).
113. Id.
114. Bipartisan Trade Deal, Office of the United States Trade Representative,
Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy (May 2007),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_
file127_11319.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9V2-EXWU].
115. Kimberly Ann Elliott & Richard B. Freeman, The Role Global Labor
Standards Could Play in Addressing Basic Needs, in GLOBAL INEQUALITIES
AT WORK: WORK’S IMPACT ON THE HEALTH OF INDIVIDUALS, FAMILIES, AND
SOCIETIES 299, 302 (Jody Heymann ed., 2003).
116. See Department for International Development, Labour Standards and
Poverty Reduction (May 2004),
https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/labourstandardsJune04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/83RF-T754] (“Development co-operation can support both
the capacity of marginalised workers to organise to make claims, and the
capacity of the justice and regulatory systems to respond to abuses of workers’
rights.”).
117. Daniel Viederman, Overseas Sweatshops Are a U.S. Responsibility, BUSINESS
WEEK (Jun. 2007).
118. Editorial Board, supra note 50 (“By far the biggest concern, aside from the
particulars of the side deals, is whether President Obama’s successor will
actively enforce the T.P.P.’s provisions.”).
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standards actually the correct standards? To understand this, TPP
member countries need to determine the best course of action for
countries as individual entities to make substantial changes to their
labor conditions.
Rather than forcing countries to make the large jump to meet all
of the ILO labor standards, it might be better to focus on more essential
rights for workers initially, and then move on to the other ILO
standards. If third world countries can solve the problem of worker
safety and child labor first, it might then be easier to move forward to
collective bargaining rights. Also, if there is not enough money involved,
there is no point to having unions involved. Companies would just go
bankrupt if they were to give wage increases, which is why the
redistribution solution is key. Without money, it will be extremely
difficult to make substantial changes.
TPP member countries have to understand that developing
countries might not have the same values when it comes to labor unions
that the U.S. and the western powers do. As discussed above, Vietnam,
for example, has the right to organize included in its constitution,119 but
that right has only been paid lip service to since there are no laws to
help protect workers’ utilization of their right.120
Another issue to consider is what the potential negative
implications are when countries try to meet the ILO standards. It is a
wonderful thing to get rid of child labor, but what is the alternative to
children working? Just saying get rid of children working is great in
theory, but if the rich countries are not there to follow through with
the implications of that change in culture, then the system will just fall
back into the same cycle it is stuck in now.
In some countries, there is a lack of school systems, and therefore
children get jobs because they cannot go to school.121 If third world
countries eliminate child labor, children would need to be provided a
place to go during the day. There would need to be a massive
investment in education. There could be a similar pot to give countries
funds for education to the one that is used in the governmental solution
to fighting labor violations discussed below.
V. Redistributive Solutions That Can Fix the Broken
Incentives Between Free Trade and Labor Standards
The current approach to improving labor standards in third world
countries through the use of free trade agreements is flawed. The
tension between free trade and labor rights is what prevents labor
119. Bradsher, supra note 60.
120. Bradsher, supra note 60.
121. Faraaz Siddiqi and Harry Anthony Patrinos, CHILD LABOR: ISSUES,
CAUSES AND INTERVENTIONS, HUMAN CAPITAL DEV. AND OPERATIONS
POL’Y WORKING PAPERS, HCOWP 56, 6.
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standards from being enforced. As long as this tension remains, the
incentives to improve labor will never be strong enough to overcome
the monetary incentive to trade freely. The solution to fix this broken
system is to change the incentives to make it financially prudent for
countries to improve labor rights. The only way to accomplish that is
through redistribution from rich to poor of the wealth created by free
trade. If third world countries have a monetary incentive to improve
labor standards, they will not need the U.S. to enforce those standards
because they will want to improve labor standards in order to make
money. If rich countries are giving poor countries money to improve
their labor conditions, then the rich countries will want to make sure
that poor countries are spending the money they receive to improve
labor conditions. Additionally, rich countries will want to reap the
rewards of sharing with poorer countries. This will lead rich countries
to make sure that workers in poor countries have money to grow the
global economy, which will increase the size of the pot of wealth for all
countries. Only after the redistribution of wealth shifts the incentives
to improve labor standards will real change be realized.
The only way to make progress and enhance labor rights in
developing countries is to find a mechanism that redistributes wealth
and allows developing countries to grow economically and protect labor
rights at the same time. My approach to this problem is to find a way
to diffuse the tension between free trade and increasing labor standards.
In this paper I evaluate various ways to create growth and
redistribution.
Central to many of these approaches is an independent
international agency to determine labor standards on a country-by-
country basis and to manage compliance with those labor standards.
The reason this agency is vital is that there needs to be a central agency
that takes input from all countries around the world to decide what the
proper labor standards are, and then to make sure that countries
comply with those standards. Only an international agency can be
neutral when evaluating different countries, otherwise there would be
too much room for deceit between countries.
This section discusses ways to solve the problem of the conflict
between free trade and labor rights by creating an international agency
to evaluate labor conditions of manufacturers, government level
solutions, company-level solutions, consumer level solutions, and the
costs and benefits of revenue sharing.
A. Create an Inspection Agency to Determine if Manufacturing Facilities
Meet Labor Standards
Before enforcement of these standards is possible, an inspection
agency must be created to determine if manufacturing facilities meet
labor standards. The inspection agency must be international. If it were
only a country-run agency the incentives would be awry. Countries
would have an incentive to say that more of their facilities meet labor
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standards so that their country gets more money. This would lead to
dishonesty and disputes between countries.
A centralized agency run by the United Nations or a similar
international agency would allow all countries to have a say in the
process, but still create a more neutral agency to make these decisions
on whether labor standards are met. Because so much money will be at
risk, a neutral agency must make the decision.
The agency would be similar to the U.S. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration. The agency would do inspections randomly, as
well as if someone alerted it to a violation. The agency would create a
standard that each manufacturing facility would need to meet to be
eligible for any of the solutions proposed below. A concern for this
agency is that the U.S. or other Western forces might try to dominate
it and take a disproportionate share of the influence. The ILO has faced
criticism for giving too much influence to the U.S. because it gives a
considerable amount of funding to the agency.122
All of the member countries would fund the agency. Possible ways
to determine funding are: (1) an even amount paid by each country
annually; (2) a percentage of each country’s annual Gross Domestic
Product; or (3) a voluntary amount with a minimum level a country
could not go below, but leaving room to go above if it wanted to make
a statement that it takes cleaning up labor violations seriously.
B. Redistributive Solutions can be Made on Three Different Levels –
Governmental, Company, or Consumer
Solutions for redistributing wealth can be made on three different
levels – governmental, company, and consumer. All three of these levels
come down to consumers. Taxes will drive governmental costs onto
consumers, and companies will pass on costs to consumers via higher
prices. Although consumers will be footing the bill in the end, the
solutions each start at one of the three levels. Countries can choose
which solutions work best for them individually, and can use all
solutions that are viable. All of the levels work together or
independently. Parts C, D, and E of this Note outline the different
redistributive solutions, and the cost and benefit of each solution.
C. Governmental Level Redistributive Solution
To make a substantial change from a government level, there needs
to be money put into the pot by the richer countries. The TPP should
create an account that all rich countries that are part of the TPP put
money into. This money would be sent to countries that are not meeting
labor standards to help build new manufacturing plants that meet
modern safety standards, or to help renovate current facilities to create
safe working conditions.
122. Guy Standing, The ILO: An Agency for Globalization?, 39 DEV. & CHANGE
355, 376 (2008).
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The money should come from what the rich countries are saving by
being a part of the free trade agreement. For example, if Canada were
to save $100,000 as a result of entering the TPP, it would have to set
aside $10,000 to put into the pot for upgrades to the infrastructure in
countries struggling to meet labor standards. A certain percentage of
savings will go into this account for countries to use to improve building
conditions.
Countries will receive funding as a result of their current non-
compliance with the ILO labor standards. Those countries will all get
the same amount to start with, and only get more money if they can
prove they are using the money to foster compliance with the ILO labor
standards. The countries who receive these funds must prove that they
are using them to conform to labor safety standards to avoid corruption
problems. To do this, the countries must show the international
reviewing body financial statements of how the money they receive is
spent, and allow them to visit the facilities to make sure that there are
actual results and not just a paper trail. This will be an ongoing source
of funds as long as the TPP is in effect. Countries will only qualify for
funding if they are proving that they are using them for improving labor
safety conditions. The problem with this method is that it might
incentivize countries to fail to maintain their labor standards, in order
to become a money receiver instead of a payer as part of this scheme.
Over time, it may lead to more and more countries failing to meet labor
standards, instead of having the problem countries meet the standards
this may end up creating more problem countries. The inspection
agency will need to be mindful of these possible problems to help
prevent or deter them.
In addition, it would be hard to convince the rich countries to agree
to this solution, because they would be footing the bill for labor
improvements in foreign lands. This is not a fatal objection, however.
Rich countries would have to understand that because they are
benefiting from free trade then they are not losing money. Rich
countries would be shooting themselves in the foot by keeping the poor
countries poor, because if there were more middle class countries, there
would be more money to buy products from rich countries.
D. Company Level Redistributive Solutions
Redistributive solutions can also be invoked at the company level.
Public relations campaigns have been used to induce companies to use
suppliers with adequate labor standards.123 Nike has been the biggest
123. Max Nisen, How Nike Solved Its Sweatshop Problem, BUSINESS INSIDER (May
9, 2013 10:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-nike-solved-its-
sweatshop-problem-2013-5 [https://perma.cc/9ZNP-ATS2] (Analyzing how
Nike was publicly shamed for its labor practices and has since brought
“factories into line . . . [and] executed one of the greatest image turnarounds
in recent decades”).
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example of this.124 In the mid-1990s Nike was accused of using
sweatshops and child labor to manufacture its products in Asia.125 In
June of 1996, Bob Herbert wrote three pieces in the New York Times
calling out Nike for exploiting cheap labor in Asia by moving around
looking for the lowest wages, giving workers no rights, and working
them in terrible conditions.126 Nike had to answer consumer concerns
about the use of sweatshops after a global boycott campaign took place
in 1997.127
This boycott left an impact on Nike, reducing sales to the point
where Nike had to commit to make changes to working conditions in
Asia.128 While Nike has increased transparency by publishing a list of
factories it contracts with and conditions in its factories,129 the problem
is that the effect these campaigns have had on labor rights is not
clear.130 Nike has been dealing with this issue for the last 25 years and
has not solved its problems, so it seems that the effect of this public
relation campaign is minimal.131 At a certain point, however, no matter
124. Id.
125. Burhan Wazir, Nike Accused of Tolerating Sweatshops, GUARDIAN (May 19,
2001 7:29 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may/20/burhanwazir.theobserver
[https://perma.cc/J9HB-YZJG].
126. Bob Herbert, In America; Nike’s Pyramid Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 10,
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/10/opinion/in-america-nike-s-
pyramid-scheme.html [https://perma.cc/SCF6-6VAL]; Bob Herbert, In
America; Nike’s Bad Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 14, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/14/opinion/in-america-nike-s-bad-
neighborhood.html [https://perma.cc/7F59-ULZB]; Bob Herbert, In
America; From Sweatshops To Aerobics, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 24, 1996),
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/24/opinion/in-america-from-sweatshops-
to-aerobics.html [https://perma.cc/3SMH-SQ7U].
127. See Simon Birch, How activism forced Nike to change its ethical game,
GUARDIAN (Jul. 6, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/green-
living-blog/2012/jul/06/activism-nike [https://perma.cc/3N5Z-9WTT]
(stating that Nike was the target of this boycott because it was a well-known
brand and had initially denied responsibility for abusing workers).
128. John H. Cushman Jr., Nike Pledges to End Child Labor And Apply U.S. Rules
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/business/international-business-nike-
pledges-to-end-child-labor-and-apply-us-rules-abroad.html
[https://perma.cc/ZRX4-SB26].
129. Nisen, supra note 123.
130. See Nisen, supra note 123 (“Transparency doesn’t change ongoing reports of
abuses, still-low wages, or tragedies like the one in Bangladesh.”).
131. Shelly Banjo, Inside Nike’s Struggle to Balance Cost and Worker Safety in
Bangladesh, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2014, 10:38 PM), available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303873604579493502231397
942 [https://perma.cc/SG3Z-YUK7].
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what the public relations are, Nike will reach a breaking point in its
profit margins in which it cannot make any more sacrifices.132
Four possible solutions that will incentivize companies to buy from
suppliers that meet ILO standards are: (1) requiring companies to only
buy from suppliers that meet ILO standards; (2) all suppliers that meet
ILO standards are guaranteed a level of production from companies;
(3) companies provide a list of all of their suppliers, and are rated based
on how many of their suppliers meet ILO standards; and (4) tax breaks
for companies that buy only from suppliers that meet ILO standards.
1. Solution #1: all companies based in TPP countries can only buy
from suppliers that meet ILO standards
One solution is to use the framework of the TPP to make sure
companies only use suppliers that meet current labor standards. The
TPP can have a provision that forces all companies based in any of the
twelve member countries to only buy from manufacturers that the
independent inspection agency approves. The costs of this approach will
mean that these companies will only be able to buy from higher priced
manufacturers, leading to either higher prices for their goods for
consumers or relocating their suppliers outside of the twelve member
countries. If companies leave the member countries to search for
cheaper suppliers, the incentive to conform to the labor standards goes
away, because there will be no buyers. In addition, it will defeat the
purpose of the free trade agreement if countries are not producing trade
goods.
The benefit of this approach hangs on the assumption that
companies will continue to buy from manufacturers in the twelve
member countries, and by doing so will incentivize all manufacturers
to meet the labor standards or risk losing all of their business to their
compliant competitors. In this approach, eventually all of the non-
compliant manufacturers will die out and only ones that have advanced
to meet ILO labor standards will remain. The problem, even if this does
succeed, will be that companies will pass along to consumers the
increase in the cost of companies buying from these improved
manufacturers. An evaluation of the full ramifications of this potential
consequence would take place after this solution comes into effect.
2. Solution #2: all suppliers meeting ILO standards receive a
guaranteed level of production from companies
Another company level solution is to have companies grant all
manufacturing facilities that meet labor standards a guaranteed
production level from different businesses, from the twelve member
countries, for a certain period of time. The problems with this approach
are getting the companies to agree to a certain level of production,
figuring out which facilities get what amount of production, and the
132. Id.
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dispute resolution procedure if there is a problem. Guaranteed
production levels could create in-fighting between manufacturers and
could lead to bribery towards whoever is determining the level of
production guaranteed to each factory. It also takes some flexibility out
of the hands of companies, which could lead them to fight back against
this arrangement.
The benefit to guaranteeing production levels is that if a company
guarantees a manufacturer a certain level of production, it can do a
better evaluation of the costs and benefits of meeting the ILO labor
standards. The benefit to the companies is that it wipes their hands of
having to search out for suppliers that meet labor standards, and they
do not have to take the blame in the event that they use a manufacturer
that the international inspection agency approves as an ILO labor
standard complier if something does go wrong.
3. Solution #3: companies must provide a list of their suppliers and
receive a rating based on how many meet ILO standards
Another solution is to make companies provide an up-to-date list
of all of their suppliers and use the labor standards of the suppliers as
a reflection on the companies. Nike already does this in response to the
public relation campaign against it.133 Then the inspection agency will
provide a list of all suppliers who meet the labor standards so that
interested parties can know which companies are using suppliers that
meet labor standards and what percentage of those suppliers meet the
standards.
Companies could get a labor rating based on this analysis. The
same international agency that evaluates the manufacturers can give
each company a labor rating on either a pass/fail basis or a one through
ten scale.
4. Solution #4: companies receive tax breaks for buying exclusively
from suppliers that meet ILO standards
Another company level solution is to give tax breaks to companies
that only buy from manufacturers that the international inspection
agency approves. A problem with this approach is that it does not give
money directly to the countries that need the money to improve their
working conditions. The potential benefit is that this has a two-pronged
incentive that will help increase labor standards. First, it will
incentivize companies to buy only from suppliers that meet labor
standards. If this outcome occurs, then it will incentivize manufacturers
to improve the labor conditions to get on the list of approved suppliers
in order to get business from these companies. This condition needs to
be met before the ultimate goal can be realized.
133. From Monitoring Factories to Engaging Workers, NIKE,
http://news.nike.com/pages/manufacturing [https://perma.cc/AGD8-57FD]
(last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
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While this solution might take the longest to take effect, it is the
best company level solution, because it allows companies to have
autonomy over their decisions of how much to produce and which
manufacturers to use, while at the same time clearly incentivizing them
to use manufacturers that meet the labor standards of the international
inspection agency. By giving a business incentive to companies, this
solution incentivizes companies to support manufacturers that meet
labor standards, while also receiving a monetary incentive to go this
route.
E. Consumer Level Redistributive Solutions
Most of the solutions discussed above will end up passing the
increased costs of better labor conditions onto the consumers. The main
concern with this method is that the goal of free trade agreements is to
lower costs of goods for consumers. Decreased expense to the consumer
would lead to happier voters who will re-elect the politicians who
created the agreements. If the cost of goods does not go down as the
result of a free trade agreement, then there is really no point to the
agreement.
Two possible solutions that will incentivize consumers to buy from
suppliers that meet ILO standards are: (1) creating a tax on goods
made under inadequate labor standards; and (2) creating labels for
products to show the labor conditions where a product was
manufactured.
1. Solution #1: tax on goods made under inadequate labor standards
Governments can create a tax on goods made under inadequate
labor standards. The goal of this tax would be to make the products
just as expensive as or more expensive than similar products made in
conditions that meet the ILO labor standards. Calculation of the tax
will have to be based on current market prices to make sure the
incentives to deter the purchase of goods produced under inadequate
labor standards are still in place. The tax will need to be adjustable as
market prices change beyond a pre-agreed upon variation. The
international inspection agency will be responsible for deciding tax
rates.
2. Solution #2: labeling products to show labor conditions where a
product was manufactured
Companies can create labels to place on all goods to show whether
they make the goods in a factory that meets labor standards or not.
This will allow socially conscious consumers to easily buy from
manufacturers that use suppliers that meet labor standards. This will
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also be a public relations campaign that might shame companies into
only using suppliers with good labor standards.134
This approach could cause anger within companies over the cost to
produce these labels. As of now, it is unclear what effect, if any this
will actually have on labor standards in foreign countries. These labels
may not have any effect on consumer purchasing practices and
therefore, would not lead to any change in labor practices. If consumers
do not care what kind of working conditions under which their products
are manufactured, then consumers will not change their purchasing
habits to influence labor conditions.
An example of this strategy can be found in the food industry. A
Vermont law is the first to mandate labels that tell consumers they are
buying food with genetically modified organisms (GMOs). This solution
is meeting a lot of pushback to keep labeling voluntary.135 Critics say
that the labels could mislead consumers or cause the costs of products
to increase based on the printing costs of these labels. If labeling food
with GMOs eventually becomes mandatory in the U.S., it would not be
difficult to use the same model to label labor conditions on products.
The same arguments against labeling will exist, but the benefit of
knowledge gives consumers the ability to choose what matters to them.
F. Other Considerations: Revenue Sharing Example
The biggest criticism of these proposed solutions is getting the rich
to agree to help the poor financially. Redistribution is great in theory,
134. There are a number of Environmental Product Declarations, such as Energy
Star and FairTrade labels, being used on products, which promote an easy
comparison between goods. See What is an EPD?, INTERNATIONAL EPD
SYSTEM, http://www.environdec.com/en/What-is-an-EPD/
[https://perma.cc/3Q84-ET2C] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (“An EPD is an
independently verified and registered document that communicates
transparent and comparable information about the life-cycle environmental
impacts of products.”); Introduction to Ecolabels and Environmental Product
Declarations, ECO SPECIFIER GLOBAL,
http://www.ecospecifier.com.au/knowledge-green/technical-
guides/technical-guide-9-introduction-to-ecolabels-and-environmental-
product-declarations/#internationalagencies [https://perma.cc/YRA8-
BX88] (last visited Mar. 13, 2016) (Ecolabels inform consumers about the
environmental impacts from producing or using a product by setting
minimum environmental and health standards for specific product
categories.).
135. See, e.g., Greg Trotter, GMO labeling debate puts food industry on defensive,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 12, 2016),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-gmo-food-labeling-0313-biz-
20160311-story.htm.(“Large food manufacturers based in the Chicago area .
. . support voluntary labeling [for genetically modified foods], saying
mandatory labels would mislead consumers and that the extra labeling and
production costs could be passed on to consumers.”).
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but there must be a way to entice the rich to give up some of their
wealth to help the poor make improvements to labor conditions. The
easy case for redistribution of wealth is on moral grounds. There is a
moral obligation to help others gain fair and safe treatment in the
workplace. As the ones with the means to make this happen, the rich
must fulfill their moral obligation by sending funds to the poor. This
argument, while being easy to make, might not hold the most weight.
The solution is to redistribute wealth in a way that not only helps
working conditions in poor countries but makes the entire pie bigger so
that the rich have a monetary incentive to agree to redistribution.
An example of redistribution that makes the pie bigger is revenue
sharing in the NFL, NBA and MLB.136 In each of these three leagues,
there is some form of revenue sharing. Usually, these arrangements have
to do with national television agreements where smaller market teams
make more money from the deal than they should, as a proportion of
how many viewers they bring in.137 Owners from large markets agree to
this because even though they are giving up what is their fair share of
revenue from the television deal, the redistribution helps the league do
better financially overall. This is because it makes all teams more
competitive and therefore, creates a better product. A better product
brings more fans to the seats and more money for the next television
deal, and as a result, creates a much larger pie.
The goal of the redistribution is to create a bigger pie. The U.S.
economy should benefit from redistribution because if the poorer
countries that the U.S. trades with become middle class countries, they
will have more money to buy U.S. products.
VI. Conclusion
The TPP fails to address the inherent tension between free trade
and labor rights. The TPP only addresses the process of improving
labor standards on the surface, but does not address the real problem
– that enforcing labor rights will kill free trade.
The solutions proposed in this Note work to shift the focus from
enforcement to a redistributive solution. These solutions give
governments, companies and consumers different ways to actually
address the problem of poor labor conditions and make a meaningful
determination of what each group is willing to do to effect change. Only
once there are concrete incentives for the enforcement of labor rights
will labor conditions improve across the globe.
136. Howard Bloom, NFL revenue-sharing model good for business, SPORTING
NEWS (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl-news/4607230-nfl-
revenue-sharing-television-contracts-2014-season-business-model-nba-nhl-
mlb-comparison-salary-cap [https://perma.cc/E4P7-M2VU].
137. Id.
